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PAPER 5: EMPLOYEE-RELATED INCENTIVES IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Wilson (1989) believes that key challenges that managers face is to (a) define core tasks of their organization and (b) find incentives that will induce operators "to perform those tasks as defined" (p. 174). Identify and describe employee-related incentives typically used in higher education, reviewing strengths and weaknesses of each. Evaluate the role that the different approaches play in motivating faculty to perform various types of tasks. Propose an optimal approach that encourages sustained excellence.

Introduction: Management Challenges and Tools

Human relations experts conceive management primarily as a “mechanism for influencing the behavior of individual subordinates" (Scott, 2003, p. 63). Stogdill, Scott, and Jaynes (1957) conclude that "the degree to which the supervisor is a good organizer who can 'get the work out'” is a key management task. The rational theory of system management assumes that:

1. Individuals dislike work and will seek to avoid it.
2. To achieve objectives, most workers must be coerced, controlled, directed, or threatened with punishment.
3. Employees desire security, prefer to be directed, have little ambition, and want to avoid responsibility (McGregor, 1960, pp. 33-34).

Human relations theory, in contrast, assumes that:

1. Most individuals do not inherently dislike work.
2. Objectives may be achieved without external control and threats of punishment.
3. The most significant rewards are those associated with “the satisfaction of ego and self-actualization” (pp. 47-48).

Leventhal (1976) indicates that managers use rewards to maintain a stable work group, satisfy workers, and stimulate productivity. Baldwin and Krotseng (1985) assert that the goal of any incentive program is to encourage or compel workers towards excellence and performance.

Wilson (1989) believes that managers must find incentives that will induce staff to perform core tasks to the best of their ability and in a manner defined by the organization. One thing is clear—participants must be induced to make contributions in sufficient quantities or the organization will not survive (Scott, 2003, p.67).

This paper explores the concept of incentives and the link between incentives, core tasks, and performance in institutions of higher education. Most of the available literature that explores this topic appears to focus on extrinsic incentives. However, extrinsic incentives usually fail to explain reasons why people volunteer services or choose to serve at institutions that offer lesser extrinsic rewards. In-depth analysis suggests that (a) there is no perfect set of incentives that will appeal to all workers and (b) achieving sustained excellence in higher education depends on alignment of personal and institutional values. This leads to a proposition that to achieve sustained excellence institutions should assure that potential employees hold values that are compatible with institutional goals, objectives, policies, and procedures.

The first section of this paper identifies and describes typical job-related incentives used in higher education, reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of each. The second section examines a related concept—disincentives. The third section examines the role that situational factors play in incentive processes. The fourth section discusses the interrelations ships among the first three topics. The fifth section summarizes what is known about the roles that different incentives play in motivating employees, followed by a discussion that relates section five with the first three topics. The seventh section examines the concept of a vocational call, which may be particularly relevant in religious colleges, followed by a discussion of how the concept relates to earlier sections. The ninth section examines the relationship of incentives and vocational calls with respect to encouraging sustained excellence. This is followed by a summary, conclusions, and suggestions regarding needed research,

The Concept of Incentives

In the business field, incentives are key components of principal-agent theory, wherein one party (the principal) delegates work to another (an agent) (Desouza & Awazu, 2004). A principal cannot be certain that an agent will always act in the manner that the principal desires. The two entities may have different goals, desires, and perspectives. Incentive cost measures the expense incurred to cause the agent's actions to align with the principal's goals. However, incentives do not ensure success—self-interests sometimes cause individuals to act in ways that do not benefit the principal, group, or organization (p. 10). This parallels the observations of psychologists that incentives usually relate to motives—reasons people hold for initiating and performing a given behavior, such as a desire, goal, or unfinished activity (Reiss, 2004, p. 179). Reiss notes that motives indicate a meaning for the behavior and may reveal an individual's personal values. Reiss's theory suggests that an individual's motives may play an important role in regulating production.

Aristotle (330 BC/1908/1999) discussed the concept of motives as focusing either on ends or means. Reiss (2004) equates means with engaging in an activity to obtain a reward (e.g., a salary) or "operationally separable consequences" (Deci and Ryan, 2000, p. 233). Reiss equates ends with engaging in a behavior for no apparent reason other than individual desire (e.g., for curiosity, physical exercise). Psychologists commonly refer to rewards as extrinsic incentives and desires as intrinsic incentives. Extrinsic rewards involve encouragement or incentives from outside oneself. Such outside rewards include money, awards, praise, or other task-dependent incentives. In contrast, intrinsic rewards are those that internally motivate, encourage, or stimulate individuals. In essence, intrinsic rewards self reinforce.

Economists typically divide incentives into three classes:

1. Financial (or material) incentives – involves a reward (typically money or an equivalent) in exchange for acting in a specified way;
2. Coercive incentives – when physical force may be used as a sanction against an individual or group;
3. Moral incentives – when a choice is regarded as the right or admirable thing to do (Johnson, 2005, ¶ 2).

Financial and coercive incentives are clearly extrinsic. However, while some individuals may consider moral incentives as intrinsic, Wikipedia (2004) suggests that a moral incentive may be rewarded by community admiration (if acted upon) or community condemnation (if not acted upon) (¶ 2) and thus may be extrinsic.

Resolving such taxonomical differences is beyond the scope this paper and is not critical to the primary topic. However, the general division of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives provides a useful framework for organizing and discussing the topic of incentives. The subsections below address research related to intrinsic incentives, extrinsic incentives, and potential impact of one on the other.

Intrinsic Incentives

Reiss (2004) states that he and his graduate students have been conducting research on intrinsic motivation for the past decade. He notes that proponents of unitary (or global) theory believe that end goals can be expressed in a few basic categories. For example,

> The ancient Greek philosophers . . . reduced end goals into categories expressing the needs of the body, mind, and soul . . . . Hedonists distinguished between end goals associated with pleasure enhancement and those related to pain reduction . . . . Freud (1916/1963) reduced motives to sexual and aggressive instincts. (Reiss, p. 180)

Some psychologists classify end goals into two global categories—drives and intrinsic motives. Early workers (e.g., Hull, 1943) recognized four types of drives: hunger, thirst, sex, and escape from pain, but unitary theorists found other motives—such as curiosity, autonomy, and play—that were difficult to explain by drive theory (Reiss, 2004, p. 180). For example, Ryan and Deci (2000) noted that some people derive pleasure simply from engaging in a particular activity (e.g., painting, reading) simply for its own sake.

Reiss (2004) and his students conducted an extensive review of the literature to compile a list of "every motive we could imagine" (p. 185). After eliminating redundancies and "motives that have relatively little psychological significance" (p. 185), their list contained 328 items. Research participants were asked to rate the relative importance of these factors. Reiss reported that there appear to be 16 categories of end motives that are psychologically significant (Table 1).

Reiss's theory involves 8 hypotheses (Table 2). Of these eight hypotheses, numbers 5, 6, and 7 appear to be important for supervisors and employers to understand and may affect performance. First, individuals prioritize the 16 basic desires differently. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is true; for example, in the late 1980s, California State supervisors were advised that some employees regard overtime assignments as a reward (an opportunity to increase earnings) while others regard such assignments as punishments (an impingement on personal freedom). Second, if each value is a continuum anchored by opposite extremes, some individuals may value money, status, honor, idealism, etc., while others either reject or do not value these items.

Table 1

Reiss's 16 motives

Motive name	Motive	Intrinsic feeling
Power	Desire to influence (including leadership; related to mastery)	Efficacy
Curiosity	Desire for knowledge	Wonder
Independence	Desire to be autonomous	Freedom
Status	Desire for social standing (including desire for attention)	Self-importance
Social contact	Desire for peer companionship (desire to play)	Fun
Vengeance	Desire to get even (including desire to compete, to win)	Vindication
Honor	Desire to obey a traditional moral code	Loyalty
Idealism	Desire to improve society (including altruism, justice)	Compassion
Physical exercise	Desire to exercise muscles	Vitality
Romance	Desire for sex (including courting)	Lust
Family	Desire to raise own children	Love
Order	Desire to organize (including desire for ritual)	Stability
Eating	Desire to eat	Satiation (avoidance of hunger)
Acceptance	Desire for approval	Self-confidence
Tranquility	Desire to avoid anxiety, fear	Safe, relaxed
Saving	Desire to collect, value of frugality	Ownership

Source: Reiss (2004, p. 187)

Table 2

The eight hypotheses that comprise Reiss's theory of 16 intrinsic motives

1. Each of the 16 desires is a trait motive.
2. Except possibly for idealism and acceptance, the desires motivate animals as well as people.
3. The desires are genetically distinct with different evolutionary histories.
4. Satiation of each basic desire produces an intrinsically valued feeling of joy, a different joy for each basic desire.
5. Although everybody embraces the 16 basic desires, individuals prioritize them differently.
6. Each basic desire is theoretically regarded as a continuum of potential motivation anchored by opposite values.
7. The theory holds that motivation results from discrepancies between the amount of an intrinsic satisfier that is desired and the amount recently experienced.
8. Basic desires organize our attention, cognitions, feelings, and behavior into a coherent action or whole.

Source: Condensed and paraphrased after Reiss (2004, pp. 186-188).

Third, hypothesis 7 suggests that individuals may only occasionally act in a predictable manner. If, for example, an individual desires approval (acceptance) and her/his desire has recently been satisfied s/he may choose to not act in a manner that might lead to acceptance by more groups or individuals, especially if s/he would have to expend significant effort or resources.

Supervisors also should appreciate that some motives may cause employees to engage in undesirable activities. For example, the desire for romance (or lust) may trigger sexual harassment that may lead to lawsuits (and, hence, institutions typically mandate preventative training, policies, and practices), curiosity may lead employees to devote an inordinate amount of time or effort to research, or an extreme lack of a desire to eat may lead to anorexia or other disorders.

With respect to specific intrinsic incentives (Table 3), some might be expressed by one or more specific acts (e.g., job enlargement), while others reflect attitudes or feelings (e.g.,

Table 3

Examples of Intrinsic Incentives

Acts of association/solidarity (Scott, 2003)	Personal power (Scott, 2003)
Autonomy (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985; Hagner & Schneebeck, 2001)	Pleasure (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985; Scott, 2003)
Belief of individual that s/he is influencing minds (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)	Prestige (Scott, 2003)
Commitment (Ensminger, 2002)	Satisfied ego (Scott, 2003)
Consideration [trust, friendship, respect] (Scott, 2003)	Self-actualization (Scott, 2003)
Feelings of competence (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)	Sense of belonging (Zeiss, 2004)
Feelings of self-actualization (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)	Sense of stimulation (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Job enlargement (Scott, 2003)	The need to belong (Sagor, 2002) and to be part of a group (Zeiss, 2004)
Job rotation (Scott, 2003)	The need to feel competent (Sagor, 2002)
Participation in decision making (Scott, 2003)	The need to feel optimistic (Sagor, 2002)
Perceived institutional support (Dooley & Magill, 2002)	The need to feel potent (Sagor, 2002)
	The need to feel useful (Sagor, 2002)

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

commitment, self-actualization) that also will be expressed tangibly through actions. However, whereas some intrinsic incentives will result in one to a few discrete, clearly recognizable acts, others will be reflected in an ongoing way—a continuous commitment to a lifestyle, work style, social mission, or attitude.

Extrinsic Incentives

Extrinsic incentives are closely related to two key theories: (a) expectancy theory—which holds that individuals tend to strive in their work when offered a reward that they value and (b) equity theory, which recognizes that unjust compensation results in dissatisfaction (Johnson, 1986, p. 55). Numerous authors of business and education articles list or describe extrinsic incentives. Some of these incentives permanently reward employees (e.g., a monetary bonus for recent performance or achievement, an award that the employee personally owns once it is earned) while others temporarily reward the employee (e.g., an office with a window or a private parking space that the institution continues to own and the rights to which can be taken away). Some rewards may lose value over time (e.g., today's "top-of-the-line computer" will be commonplace within a few months or years and outdated five years hence). As with intrinsic incentives, the value of various rewards will differ from person to person. For example, an employee who has no children probably will not value free child care, and the value of the free childcare may be more valued by employees who have larger families.

Some incentives are tangible (e.g., material, touchable) and some intangible (immaterial, vague). Some incentives may have elements of both. For example, an award certificate that acknowledges superior service or a special quality that an individual exhibits clearly is an object that the employee can hang on his or her wall, but the praise that accompanies the award may be as valued or more valued than the award certificate. Correspondingly the same certificate may not be valued if it is awarded without comment or accompanied by comments that the recipient deems as negative.

Many types of incentives are common throughout business and industry, while some are commonly used only in a few fields. This observation does not mean that a given incentive should always be used in a given field or that an incentive used in another field cannot and should not be extended to another field. However, Baldwin and Krosteng (1985) note that incentives sometimes are appropriate in one field but not in another; for example, incentives that foster performance among chemists may not be effective among artists (p. 15). Baldwin and Krosteng suggest that in higher education the key is to discover the incentives that are most attractive to and will most effectively stimulate the best work of faculty members (p. 11). Furthermore, they believe that having more awards (rather than one or very few) increases availability and potentially motivates more workers (p. 13).

Table 4 lists some of the extrinsic incentives that are tangible, monetary (awarded in lieu of or as a supplement to wages, or that may involve significant costs), and used in higher education and other fields. Some of the incentives listed in Table 4 (e.g., annuity enhancements, early retirement, and severance pay) may be useful for accelerating the departure of faculty whom the institution wishes would leave, but also, if properly configured, may serve as incentives to reward committed individuals who are early in their careers.

Spot bonuses may be used to encourage overburdened employees (Taylor, 2004, p. 82) or immediately reward an employee for achieving a specified objective. Spot bonuses are paid immediately—when the reward is earned—unlike annual bonuses which may be paid long after the event. Taylor advises that for spot bonuses to serve as effective incentives, employers need to make employees aware of the program, the awards, and recipients.

Table 4A

Extrinsic, tangible, incentives that usually cost money and are permanently and irrevocably awarded.

Accelerated advancement (Zeiss, 2004)
Annuity enhancements (Chronister & Kepple, 1987)
Cafeteria-style benefits (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Car washing (Zeiss, 2004)
Child care (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985; Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996; Zeiss, 2004)
Competitive pay (Zeiss, 2004)
Disability insurance (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Dry cleaning (Zeiss, 2004)
Early or phased retirement (Chronister & Kepple, 1987; Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Fair compensation (Zeiss, 2004)
Fitness centers (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Housing and/or mortgage assistance (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Liberalized actuarial reduction (Chronister & Kepple, 1987)
Life insurance (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Market-based compensation (Zeiss, 2004)
Maternity/paternity leave (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Meals (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Medical and/or dental insurance for employees and/or retirees (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Merit raises (Zeiss, 2004)
Merit-based compensation (Zeiss, 2004)
Parking and/or transportation (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Profit sharing (Handy, 2002; Pfeffer, 1999a; Taylor, 2004)

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

Table 4B

Extrinsic, tangible, incentives that usually cost money and are permanently and irrevocably awarded.

Properly focused reward structures (Serow, 2000)
Retention bonuses (Taylor, 2004)
Retirement and investment programs (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Royalties (Zeiss, 2004)
Severance pay (Chronister & Kepple, 1987)
Spot bonuses (Taylor, 2004)
Tuition remission for spouses and/or children (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)
Wages (Taylor, 2004)
Wellness programs (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985; Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996)

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

Some institutions of higher education offer selected incentives (such as medical, dental, and life insurance) only to full-time, tenured, or permanent faculty and/or staff. Selected benefits may be either wholly or partially subsidized by the institution. Some benefit packages are standardized (meaning that all qualified employees essentially earn the same benefits, have the same medical insurer, etc.) while others offer employees a range of choices (e.g., they may be able to choose from among a suite of medical insurers). About 9% of institutions offer “cafeteria-style” benefit plans wherein employees may define their own compensation and benefit packages (Kirshstein, Matheson, et al., 1996, p. 35).

Kirshstein, Matheson, et al. (1996) found that 97% of institutions of higher education offer some form of retirement program. Typically these programs include TIAA/CREF, 403B, 401K, 401B, and/or state plans. Some private institutions such as Western International

University and University of Phoenix that depend on contract employees do not offer retirement programs, per se, but do offer stock options or investment programs.

Table 5 lists extrinsic, tangible incentives that usually cost money and are awarded on a one-time, temporary, or contingent basis. In essence, such incentives may be awarded in lieu of a cash award. The cost of these incentives ranges from slight to expensive. For example, tickets to sports or cultural events may cost from ten to a few hundred dollars or more each. Such awards may not be valued by all employees and, thus, may not yield positive motivational effects. If, for example, tickets to the opera are offered in a competitive performance event, persons who do not

Table 5

Extrinsic, tangible, monetary incentives that are awarded temporarily, on a one-time, short-term, or contingent basis.

Attach high compensation to organizational performance (Pfeffer, 1999a)
Continuing education stipends (Moore, 1997)
Event tickets (Taylor, 2004)
Financial planning seminars (Zeiss, 2004)
Grants and mini-grants (Moore, 1997)
Growth opportunities (travel, tuition, training) (Zeiss, 2004)
Monetary incentives (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Opportunities to produce and sell intellectual property and services (Zeiss, 2004)
Retirement planning seminars (Zeiss, 2004)
Seed money (Zeiss, 2004)
Training (Dooley & Magill, 2002; Pfeffer, 1999b)

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

enjoy opera may deem the reward as worth little or nothing. Similarly, an employee who values time with family may value four inexpensive event tickets (assuming s/he has a family of four or fewer) to a local event (e.g., the local opera or minor-league sports event) more than one expensive ticket to a high-profile event (e.g., the Super Bowl). Note also that some of the incentives (e.g., continuing education stipends, opportunities to produce and sell intellectual property and services, seed money) listed in Table 5 effectively empower, enable, or challenge employees to expand the scope of their work, serve a new constituency, or meet a new need without being a true award to be used personally outside the job. Some incentives (such as training) may be awarded on a short-term basis but potentially have long-term implications, enabling an employee to improve performance, develop new skills, and potentially benefit the institution and herself/himself.

Table 6 lists incentives that are extrinsic, tangible, non-monetary, and usually are awarded on a permanent basis. One might argue that problem counseling is not an incentive, but some individuals may value assistance in dealing with personal or family problems that may not directly impact the work environment or an individual's on-the-job performance.

As noted earlier, not all incentives are awarded on a permanent basis.

Table 7 lists extrinsic, non-monetary incentives that often are awarded on a temporary basis. Some of these items may cost money (e.g., use of a company car probably might be considered a "special privilege") but not all special privileges may have a financial cost. Some of these items may be awarded by superiors (e.g., attractive job assignment; flexible work schedules), others by peers (e.g., peer support), and some by both. For example, in the late 1990's managers California's Department of Conservation created a system of awards wherein any employee or outside constituent could nominate an employee for an award. All nominations

Table 6

Extrinsic, tangible, non-monetary incentives that are usually awarded on a permanent basis

Authorizing individuals or groups to initiate a new periodical or series of publications (Hirschhorn & May, 2000)
Employment security (Pfeffer, 1999a); tenure (Moore, 1997)
Nonmonetary perquisites (Chronister & Kepple, 1987)
Pins, buttons, medals, ribbons, certificates, trophies, employee of the month awards (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Prizes (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Problem counseling (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Promotion (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985; Moore, 1997)
Task commitment (Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980)

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

were screened by a peer committee that selected recipients on behalf of the department's Director. Some directors (such as former director Darryl Young) typically hosted a celebration, investigated the recipient's personal likes, and reflected those likes by adding the director's personally selected component (such as chocolate, coffee, and/or fruit) to the award.

Some incentives may be awarded for taking on a specified task (e.g., release time for course preparation) (Dooley & Magill, 2002). While one might argue that release time for course preparation isn't really an individual reward, the fact is that some faculty may shy away from accepting an assignment to develop a new course without release time.

Many people probably would regard almost all of the items listed in Table 7 as intangible incentives. The exceptions might be a "prime parking space" (especially if a nameplate or position title is evident) and some status symbols (e.g., a big desk, office with a window, or a

Table 7

Extrinsic non-monetary, temporary incentives

Access to or control of needed resources (Harris, 2000; Scott, 2003)
Access to state-of-the-art equipment (Moore, 1997)
Approval (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Attractive job assignment (Wilson, 1989)
Career growth opportunities (Zeiss, 2004)
Career opportunities (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Flexible work schedules (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985; Zeiss, 2004)
Peer support (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Positive feedback (Hagner & Schneebeck, 2001)
Praise (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Prime parking space (Taylor, 2004)
Recognition (Zeiss, 2004)
Release time (Zeiss, 2004)
Special privileges (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Special status designations (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Status symbols (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

personal assistant). Additionally, various staff might perceive an awarded incentive differently. For example, one individual might attempt to be supportive of a superior through actions or comments, but the recipient and/or onlookers may regard these actions and comments as “brown-nosing” or unsupportive. Some employees may question whether an executive has a personal assistant (1) as a reward or (2) because the executive’s superiors realize that the failures might regularly occur without the assistant's special abilities to keep the executive organized, on track, and productive.

Of course, any of the incentives listed in the above tables may be awarded in combination with one or more others (Chronister & Kepple, 1987). Group or team rewards (Harris, 2000) also are possible.

The Concept of Disincentives

Disincentives are "stimuli that . . . evoke avoidance, or refraining" (Katzell & Thompson, 1990, p. 145). YourDictionary.com (2000) describes disincentive as "Something that prevents or discourages action; a deterrent." Disincentives may be intentional (as a tax code provision that discourages sale of investments held for less than two years) or unintentional. List, Millimet, and McHone (2004) cite provisions of the Clean Air Act that discourage plant modification because such modifications require extensive and costly regulatory reviews as constituting such unintentional disincentives. Sliwka (2003) reports that requiring decisions to be unanimous weakens incentives that are intended to promote innovation.

Table 8 is a compilation of disincentives mentioned or discussed in the literature. Some of these disincentives are institutional (e.g., bureaucratic rules, threats of punishment, work overload) in origin and some originate from individual co-workers (e.g., expectations of peers, how others express value of a given individual's work). Some even originate within the individual. For example, an employee may feel overloaded because s/he has accepted responsibilities from outside the institution that compete for attention or because of a change in a key personal situation (e.g., a change in health or family status).

Perceptual differences and individual needs may account for some disincentives. An employee who feels unappreciated may simply not recognize acknowledgements from

Table 8

Disincentives

Bureaucratic roles (Lashway, 1995)	Miserable job assignment (Wilson, 1989)
Competitive goals and administrative structures (Harris, 2000)	Perception of being undervalued (Zeiss, 2004)
Cronyism (Edwards, 1996)	Perception of job insecurity (Zeiss, 2004)
Distrust (Zeiss, 2004)	Poor work environment (Zeiss, 2004)
Expectations of peers (Wilson, 1989)	Reward structures not focused on core tasks or focused on only a few core tasks (Serow, 2000)
External control (Scott, 2003)	Threats of punishment (Scott, 2003)
Hierarchical decision making (Joyce, 2000)	Threats to change the status quo in unknown ways (Julnes and Holzer, 2001)
"I won't get anything out of this" and similar conjured attitudes (Luthans, 2002)	Tenure, after it is attained (Adams, 2004)
Inadequate compensation (Zeiss, 2004)	Unwanted controls in low visibility situations (Wilson, 1989)
Inappropriate reward structures (Serow, 2000)	Work overload (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)
Lack of communication (Joyce, 2000)	
Little or no recognition (Zeiss, 2004)	
Little sense of purpose at work (Zeiss, 2004)	

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

supervisors or co-workers. In most, if not all, cases, communication is key in avoiding promulgation and perpetuation of such unintentional disincentives.

An anecdote related by Adams (2004) suggests that, once attained, some incentives may become disincentives. Adams describes behavioral changes that occur at his institution as follows: Candidates for tenure are overly pleasant and cooperative until tenure is attained; afterwards, they become rude, withdrawn, show up late to meetings, answer cell phones during meetings, become inaccessible to students, and seldom seen on campus by other instructors. Sometimes disincentives result from fear. For example, although performance measures may generate positive data, individuals who wish to protect a given program may fear potential future criticism and future—unknown—changes. Similarly, although approaches that tie outcome measures to programs and the budget process may result in greater flexibility (an incentive) in budget and personnel management, it also may result in disincentives such as greater oversight, reduction of managerial salaries, and more restrictions (Wiesbord, 2004).

Situational Factors That Influence Performance

Literature Review

Various situational factors may, whether intentionally or unintentionally, impact or influence performance (Table 9). Some of these factors may constitute an incentive—an situational factor that is personally valued. For example, a power structure that opens career paths (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985) may entice employees to maintain a high level of performance and remain with the institution rather than seek other employment. Similarly, an extremely heavy workload may serve as a powerful disincentive, perhaps demoralizing employees and causing them to resign or seek other employment. However, these same situational factors may affect different employees differently. For example, some high-level administrators might feel threatened by the very same policies that provide lower-level employees the opportunities to advance. Similarly, an employee who enjoys hard work and is not hesitant about committing extra hours might enjoy the challenge that a heavy workload presents.

Some supervisors may overlook situational factors as incentives because no “awarding” takes place—the situation (including the environment) “simply exists” whether or not the employee is motivated (or demotivated). However, these situations may reflect a dominant

Table 9A

Situational Factors that Influence Performance

A "climate that fosters individuals who care, listen, understand, respect others, and are honest, open, and sensitive" (Lashway, 1995, paragraph 16)	An organization where status differences are minimal (after Pfeffer, 1999b)
A positive learning climate (Lashway, 1995)	Clear, well-communicated strategic vision (Pfeffer, 1999b)
A power structure that opens career paths (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)	Cooperative goals and administrative structures (Harris, 2000)
A sense of purpose (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)	Enthusiasm for the mission (Wilson, 1989)
A strategic theme (Hirschhorn & May, 2000)	Empowerment; authority to act (Harris, 2000; Sagor, 1992)
Affirmation (Zeiss, 2004)	Expectations of peers (Wilson, 1989)
An administration that encourages rather than restricts initiative (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)	Explicit goals (Harris, 2000)
An attractive job assignment (Wilson, 1989)	Facilitative leaders (Lashway, 1995)
An environment where participants are recognized routinely for their efforts and successes (after Zeiss, 2004)	Feedback (Harris, 2000)
An exciting and friendly environment (Zeiss, 2004)	Focus on students (National Academy for Academic Leadership, 2000)
An organization that invests in the welfare and future of the employee (Zeiss, 2004)	Focus on teaching and learning (National Academy for Academic Leadership, 2000)
	Imperatives of the situation (Wilson, 1989)
	Intellectual exchange (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

Table 9B

Situational Factors that Influence Performance

Leaders who encourage employees to think creatively and challenge themselves (Joyce, 2000)

Leaders who involve people in the planning process (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985; Joyce, 2000)

Learning opportunities (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)

Meaningful attention (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)

Meaningful dialog (French, 2000)

Open communication (Harris, 2000; Joyce, 2000)

Opportunities for self-reflection (Harris, 2000)

Organizational commitment (Pfeffer & Lawler, 1980)

Organizational goals that are congruent with personal beliefs and values (Wilson, 1989)

Personable leaders (Lashway, 1995)

Preparation time (Moore, 1997)

Protection from excessive regulation (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)

Reward structures that support the mission, vision, and priorities (Diamond, 2004, chap. 17)

Self-managed teams (Pfeffer, 1999a)

Shared information (Pfeffer, 1999b)

Shared values (Lashway, 1995)

Software, hardware (Hisrchhorn & May, 2000)

Stated purposes of the organization (Scott, 2003)

Support systems (e.g., library, computing assistance, secretary) (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)

Technical support (Moore, 1997)

Time for training (Moore, 1997)

To be valued by others (Zeiss, 2004)

Working conditions (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)

Workload (Baldwin & Krotseng, 1985)

Source: Compiled by T. C. Smith

culture and become self enforcing. For example, Neely Gardner found that “power motivations, most of them negative, [can] dictate attitudes and behaviors in organizations” (Bruce & Wyman, 1998, p. xx). Kobrak (1992) describes Gardner’s experiences at California’s Department of Water Resources (DWR), wherein managers who focused on individual advancement often attempted to belittle or undermine coworkers—a practice that Gardner called “organizational gangsterism” (Kobrak, p. 476). In *Summitry*, Garner (1974) parodied many common behaviors prevalent at DWR, such as achieving enough to keep out of trouble but no so much that you become surrounded by successful subordinates. As a former manager at another California agency, the author suspected that some subordinates adopted a similar philosophy—work just enough to keep out of trouble but not so much that they were assigned new or challenging assignments. Some employees asserted that had been coached by supervisors and/or co-workers to adopt a limited-production work ethic that was compatible with that of co-workers in order to “fit in” and “be part of the team.” Clark and Wilson (1961) call such intangible rewards “solidarity incentives” (p. 134). While one might argue that the fault lies with individual employees who hold such values and exhibit such behaviors, Gardner’s and the author’s experiences suggest that these behaviors sometimes cause good employees to flee while those who value the flawed situation are drawn to it, reinforce it, and perpetuate it, often to the detriment of the organization’s goals. Indeed, Wilson (1989) notes that “workers may bring to the organization attitudes, predispositions, and preferences that will make them responsive to incentives [such as the need to “fit in” with co-workers] over which the organization has relatively little control" (p. 49).

Such incidents suggest that for almost every positively stated incentive listed in Table 9, one might include add either a decentive or a comparable incentive to engage in undesired behavior. For example, *leaders who encourage* (Zeiss, 2004) might be restated in a negative form such as *leaders who discourage or do not encourage*—a commonly recognized demotivator. In addition, some of the listed incentives are highly situational; for example, *to be valued by others* (Zeiss, 2004) may really depend on whether the employee values a success-driven supervisor's approval more that s/he values a co-worker's *do just enough to get by* support.

This reflective analysis suggests that the most crucial situational factor listed in Table 9 might be *organizational goals that are congruent with personal beliefs and values* (Wilson, 1989). Pfeffer (1999a) notes the importance of hiring the right person for the job—someone who not only has the critical skills needed and can be trained for the job, but *who has an attitude that enables him or her to fit into the organization's culture.*

To illustrate this point, consider a hypothetical situation involving two radically different online educational institutions. In University A, faculty are directed to only post messages to students during office hours, defined as four standardized hours each day, five days each week. In University B, faculty are directed to post messages any time they wish. Both institutions direct instructors to respond to student questions within 24 hours.

Next consider two different instructors. Instructor A dislikes the idea of being on 24-call, is willingly governed by rules, and believes students should respect university rules and the instructor's schedule. Instructor B values flexibility, wants to appear highly responsive to students, and dislikes rigid rules. All other factors being equal, Instructor A would probably be happiest in University A and Instructor B would probably be happiest at University B because of the good match between individual and university values and practices (Figure 1). Similarly, the

Figure 1

Instructor-University Compatibility Model

	University A (Rule Bound Model)	University B (Flexible Model)
Instructor A: Values rigid schedule and rule-driven systems	Good Match	Mismatch
Instructor B: Values flexibility; dislikes rules	Mismatch	Good Match

University A might expect Instructor A to more willingly adhere to its rules while University B might expect Instructor B to more willingly adhere to its rules.

Discussion

Most of the incentives described to this point often are used in a scientific management (Taylor, 1911/1929) fashion. In many cases, employers typically attempt to minimize costs of incentives while achieving one or more performance objectives. Prince (2003) observes that incentive must be structured so as to encourage continued high performance, not penalize fellow staff or the institution when overall performance improves, and be renewable (pp. 63-64). Thus, in a hypothetical profit-driven institution, the principal question regarding incentives might be phrased, “How little can we pay to hire the needed number of qualified staff?”

As problems that impact the institution’s ability to maximize profit become apparent, additional incentives may bring about the desired behavior or treat underlying causes. If, for example, faculty absenteeism becomes an issue, the institution might identify the underlying causes and adopt incentives (e.g., day care centers, wellness programs, improvements in working environment) that begin to address those causes.

In institutions where quality, a special learning method, or other distinctive attribute is central to the institution's mission, the question regarding incentives might be phrased, "How little can we pay to hire the needed number of qualified staff who will deliver (or possess and exhibit) the desired distinctive?"

These scientific management approaches have detractors. For example, Kohn (1999) argues that the idea that the best way to get someone to do something is to reward him or her has become pop behaviorism – "Do this and you'll get that" (p. 3). He argues that we should not reward people for their compliance. Instead, he believes that people should be amply compensated to the point where money becomes a non-issue (p. 182). He argues to abolish merit pay, eliminate annual appraisals, and, instead, treat employees well to boost productivity (p. 186).

Kohn's view may have some merit, especially if one considers that ample compensation, elimination of appraisals, etc., may help create a setting that some individuals may enjoy and, therefore, be motivated within. However, one must also consider the current economic climate wherein the cost of higher education is viewed as unreasonably high (Brown & Gamber, 2002; Huber, 1992; Lohman, 2004). In essence, Kohn argues for abandonment of market forces. The money for compensation must come from somewhere—either higher tuition, higher taxes (for public colleges), or higher endowments and donations. He clearly values something other than money. If Kohn is correct, one might ask whether values and intrinsic motivations held by employees impact motivation and, if so, how?

Roles that Different Incentives Play in Motivating Faculty and Staff

Literature Review

As noted earlier, *intrinsically motivated activities* are those that individuals find interesting and will do “in the absence of operationally separable consequences” (Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 233). According to Deci and Ryan, researchers have explored two strands of this definition—one that the doing of an interesting activity is itself intrinsically rewarding (hence operationally separable consequences are not required) and one emphasizing that intrinsically motivated behaviors are a function of basic psychological needs. Later researchers determined that people who were interested in and chose to engage in an activity (e.g., completing a puzzle) needed to succeed at some level or would lose interest. People who were less successful in the activity tended to engage less. Such findings led Deci and Ryan to hypothesize that “Intrinsically motivated behaviors are those that are freely engaged out of interest without the necessity of separable consequences, and, to be maintained, they require satisfaction of the needs for autonomy and competence” (p. 233).

Deci (1975), Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999), Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973) and other researchers demonstrated that monetary and other tangible contingent rewards tend to undermine people’s intrinsic motivation. These researchers also demonstrated that, when extrinsic rewards are introduced, “People feel less like origins of their behavior and thus display less intrinsic motivation” (p. 234). Deci and Ryan report that experimental studies by Amabile (1982), McGraw and McCullers (1979), and Grolnick and Ryan (1987) respectively found that rewards and evaluations decrease creativity, complex problem solving, and deep conceptual processing of information (Deci and Ryan, p. 234). Field studies in schools and work settings document that support of autonomy, as opposed to control activities, aids intrinsic motivation, increases satisfaction, and enhances well-being. However, effects may vary with age because Deci et al (1999) found that tangible rewards tend to be more detrimental and verbal rewards tend to be less enhancing for young students than for college students.

Deci and Ryan (2000) theorize that extrinsic motivation also can be internalized, noting, “Internalization is an active, natural process in which individuals attempt to transform socially sanctioned mores or requests into personally endorsed values and self-regulations” (pp. 234-235). Internalization enables people to assimilate social regulations and fully accept them as their own. The more that people identify with the value of an activity, the more completely these mores and requests will be personally assimilated. In essence, people who have such experiences begin to own and exhibit the behavior autonomously. However, if people lack either a sense of autonomy or efficacy, they tend to become amotivated—lacking the intention to behave and thus lacking motivation (Baard, 1994; Deci & Ryan, 1987).

Discussion

These theories, if valid, may have application in and suggest two potential dangers to institutions of higher education. The potential application is that extrinsic motivations designed to motivate faculty and staff to focus on specific tasks and qualities may eventually become “personally endorsed.” These theories also support Diamond’s (2002) contention that incentives should be closely tied to institutional values and constructed such that rewards focus the attention of potential recipients on mission-critical activities.

The dangers suggested are twofold. First, the intrinsic motivations of employees who are already perform mission-supportive activities may be undermined when extrinsic incentives are offered to themselves or others and that creativity, complex problem solving, and deep conceptual processing of information may diminish. Second, employees who are intrinsically motivated to pursue activities that are not mission-critical may neglect some key tasks and responsibilities, preferring to concentrate on their own interest. This latter problem was fairly common at the California Geological Survey, where some geologists tended to focus on field-mapping tasks that they enjoyed and shunned writing and required administrative tasks. In an academic setting, faculty might become so involved in personal research interests or specific teaching tasks that they neglect others and, perhaps, fail to fully cover required content of a course. Other potential impacts are that faculty might use only a narrow range of teaching styles and techniques thereby making it difficult for some students to learn.

The Concept of Vocation or Calling

Literature Review

Extrinsic and intrinsic incentives may not account for the full range of motivating factors that generate action. For example, why do people become missionaries or evangelists, and why do people join organizations like the Peace Corps that pay very little? While it is possible that some people choose such occupations to gain awards or approval of others (extrinsic incentives) or to feel worthy, attain pleasure, or experience competence (intrinsic incentives), there might be a third explanation—an external calling. In tracing the history of the word vocation, Dawson (2005) notes that it is derived from the Latin word *vocatio*—a “call away from the word of productive activity in order to dedicate one’s life to prayer and contemplation” (p. 223). As time passed, the term evolved to mean, during Martin Luther’s day, a divine calling regardless of occupation. Although the term has continued to evolve, it is this form—a divine calling—that informs this essay.

In Christian churches, pastors and others frequently refer to a divine call, asking questions such as “Are you called to ministry?” or “What is the call that God has placed on your life?" The concept of a divine calling underlies best-selling books such as *The Purpose Driven Life* (Warren, 2002) and *Here I am: Now what on earth should I be doing?* (Schultze, 2005). Palmer (2000) notes that vocation is not "an act of will, a grim determination that one's life will go this way or that whether it wants to or not" (p. 4), but instead requires listening:

> I must listen to my life and understand what it is truly about—quite apart from what I would like it to be about—or my life will never represent anything real in the world, no matter how earnest my intentions . . . .
>
> Vocation does not mean a goal that I pursue. It is a calling that I hear. Before I can tell my life what I want to do with it, I must listen to my life telling me who I am. I must listen for the truths and values at the heart of my own identity, not the standards by which I *must* live—but the standards by which I cannot help but live if I am living my own life (pp. 4-5).

Palmer (2000) suggests that some people feel a calling that they cannot resist—that they are compelled to heed. In Palmer's case, he argues for a need to be true to oneself—one's own personal truths and values. In Judeo-Christian circles, the focus is on God's truths and values, and the compulsion is described as God-mandated. God called Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac (Genesis 22:1-13)—to commit an act that Abraham did not want to do. God called Moses to go to Pharaoh (Exodus 3:7-10), yet Moses protested and raised several excuses for not going (Exodus 3:11-4:11), finally begging "LORD, please send someone else to do it!" (Exodus, 4:13, Contemporary English Version). God called Jonah to deliver a message to Ninevah and Jonah attempted to flee from the task (Jonah 1). All three were called to perform tasks that they did not want to do.

One might argue that an individual who discerns and acts on a vocational call is driven by extrinsic incentives (e.g., approval of other people or God, a promise of a future reward) or intrinsic incentives (pleasure achieved by either [1] aligning actions with personal values and beliefs or [2] serving God or some perceived higher purpose). However, the biblical examples—especially the story of Jonah—suggests an absolute compulsion in spite of personal desires for pleasure or approval. Abraham complies, fearing the worst, yet having faith that God would intervene. Moses complies after protesting and being given an aide. Jonah complies only after running away, nearly losing his life, and being given it back.

While Reiss (2004) might argue that all three individuals desired tranquility, including freedom from fear, the important underlying factor—the one that may be most important for employers and leaders to understand—is that some individuals may feel called or compelled to act in spite of personal or organizational desires. Logic suggests that when such compulsions conflict with institutional mission or performance objectives, employers may find it difficult or impossible to offer extrinsic incentives that yield compliance.

The concept of a calling seemingly may present financially strapped institutions with an opportunity to hire quality staff for less cost. If, for example, someone is called to teach and offers to do so for a lesser fee, should the institution accept? The answer is unclear. Goodlad (1984) reports that teachers often were willing to forego salaries until they encountered frustrations, after which they grew dissatisfied (p. 172). For centuries, religious colleges and universities were staffed entirely by priests, monks, and pastors who were committed to their call. Some of those institutions regarded payment as gratuitous, yet they still succeeded in attracting instructors. As higher education became more sophisticated, academic programs in such institutions were criticized as mediocre and hiring practices and support activities were criticized as amateurish (Buijs, 2005, p. 338). In today's educational market and regulatory climate, if an institution accommodates instructors and staff who desire to serve for minimal compensation, then the institution still must somehow motivate such individuals to attain level of competence that regulators and customers demand. The potential exists for an instructor to begin to rationalize that s/he need only satisfy a lesser number (e.g., half) of institutional requirements or desires if s/he earns a lesser amount (e.g., half) that of a local peer or a peer at another institution—a rationalization that could adversely impact program quality, accreditation, and/or institutional mission. Thus, agreeing to pay a lesser amount might lead to future problems. Yet not agreeing to the proposal might deny both the individual the opportunity to satisfy to his or her call and the institution an opportunity to engage the individual in the furtherance of institutional objectives.

Discussion

Much of the available literature concerning incentives in higher education focuses on extrinsic incentives. In essence, the authors of those works appear to align themselves with Taylorism (Taylor, 1911/1929); such authors seem to believe that by analyzing and adjusting one or more working conditions (in this case, compensation or other external rewards), workers will be incentivized to come to work, become more productive, adhere to work requirements, or all three.

As noted earlier, individuals have different needs and desires and will value extrinsic rewards differently. Reflecting this fact, some corporations offer employees a choice of benefits instead of a take-it-or-leave-it standardized compensation package. Such flexible compensation plans appear to offer the greatest incentive value, if the organization can afford any necessary administrative costs.

The above discussion of situational conditions also reflects a Tayloristic view—that by adjusting one or more working conditions workers will become more productive or better aligned with the desires of management. As with compensation, personal likes and dislikes may cause situational adjustments to impact some individuals more than others. The optimal situational configuration may require a survey of staff to identify specific desires and allocation of scarce resources (e.g., offices with windows, new computers) in ways that optimally meet those desires.

The concept of intrinsic incentives introduces yet another level of uncertainty—that individuals derive pleasure or some other form of internal satisfaction from an activity. Just as individuals have different external needs, they may also have different intrinsic needs. Furthermore, these intrinsic needs may change with time. McGregor's (1960) observation that the most significant rewards are those associated with "the satisfaction of ego and self-actualization" (p. 48) suggests that intrinsic rewards will be more convincing than extrinsic rewards for some individuals. In other words, for some individuals, intrinsic rewards will trump extrinsic rewards. Thus, employers are faced with a challenge of identifying and, to some degree, continuously monitoring each individual's intrinsic needs. As with extrinsic incentives, to maximize effect, employers should attempt to allocate resources in ways that optimally satisfy the intrinsic needs of staff.

The concept of a vocational call adds yet another complicating factor—one that might possibly compel individuals to ignore an employer's attempt to either create extrinsic or foster intrinsic incentives that satisfy an individual's needs. For this reason, particularly in religious institutions that encourage individuals to seek their calling, employers need to consider whether an individual's perceived call aligns with the institution's mission, delivery methods, and other distinctives. Thus, the subject of institutional mission and purpose is again raised.

Relationship of Incentives to Institutional Mission, Goals, and Practices

As previously noted, Diamond (2002) believes that faculty reward systems should be "mission-driven" (p. 271). Baldwin and Krotseng (1985) agree, stating that incentives need to be structured around institutional goals (p. 15). Diamond notes that while colleges and universities often say that a particular activity (e.g., teaching) is important, in fact they often offer greater rewards for other activities (e.g., research) or achievements (e.g., published papers). Diamond argues for creation of a comprehensive system of rewards that tie processes (annual reviews, promotion, and tenure reviews), to institutional policies (mission, vision, priorities, and definitions of scholarship), and to rewards. He also suggests that reward systems need to recognize different strengths of various faculty and differences among disciplines (e.g., scholarship in art, chemistry, and engineering might be defined differently).

Diamond (2002) and Chronister and Kepple (1987) both believe that faculty need to be involved in developing or revising reward systems to assure that the views of both are considered. However, Burgan (2004) cautions that faculty tend to lack education in management, lack incentives to participate in governance, and often withdraw from their own governance roles. He notes that incentive systems that are tied to performance are, in essence, a corporate device, and faculty often argue that corporate management practices are inappropriate for higher education (p. ix). Thus, it is likely that faculty who become involved in designing incentive systems may need some management training and, as Diamond notes need to be educated about institutional priorities (p. 275).

Because employees' needs vary greatly, a flexible benefit program seems desirable. Such a program allows each employee to consider his or her needs and structure compensation in a way that best satisfies those needs. However, a flexible benefit program creates administrative workload for institutions, may deny cost savings that result from negotiating benefit packages that involve large block of employees, and, unless carefully managed, may create budget uncertainties. Therefore, some institutions may decide that a flex-elect is too costly or creates too many problems to warrant implementation.

However, one might be able to extend the flexible benefit concept beyond the traditional health, insurance, vacation, and retirement concept to allow each employee to structure compensation in ways that are compatible with personal, professional, and institutional goals. For example, if the institution wants to encourage attendance at professional conferences, it might allow employees to designate part of their standard salary to instead be used for conference fees and travel while providing a matching amount (e.g., 50% funding from the institution, 50% from the employee, and salary for time spent at the conference). Such an approach could be extended to support or promote other activities, specific performance measures, and/or programmatic goals. However, such an approach adds an element of budget uncertainty and, unlike institutions where faculty are paid from standardized salary scales, requires highly individualized salary and compensation negotiation and tracking. Hence, once again, some institutions may decide that such programs are too costly or create too many problems to warrant implementation.

As previously noted, not only does each employee potentially have a unique set of needs that may be satisfied via extrinsic incentives, s/he potentially possesses a unique set of intrinsic desires that may change through time. The optimal approach may be for institutions to examine these intrinsic desires at the employment interview stage. If, for example, a potential employee enjoys teaching, s/he may not be well-suited for an administrative or research post, and vice-versa. Of course, the potential exists that an employee could "grow" into the post or be "trained" to enjoy the job, but the potential also exists that the old behavior may resurface once job-security (e.g., tenure) is attained. The fact that (a) intrinsic desires may change through time and (b) intrinsic desires often override extrinsic rewards effectively creates a level of uncertainty regarding whether the employee will *always and forever* support or be suitable for a specified position. Therefore, even in institutions that offer tenure, a periodic post-tenure review and probationary period appears to be desirable institutional tool.

Similarly, the issue of a vocational call is unique to each employee. Some employees will have a call and some will not. Some will respond to the call and some will not. As with intrinsic desires, institutions would be wise to raise the issue during employment interviews to assure that the call properly aligns with institutional values, mission, goals, distinctives, programs, and other components. Furthermore, even though the employee may be willing to accept a lesser compensation, it may be better for the institution to suggest that the employee receive full compensation and be encouraged to donate the excess funds to a charity or institutional program. By so doing, the institution avoids the potential pitfall associated with a potential "I get paid less, so I need not obey all rules and support all goals" attitudinal problem. Just as with intrinsic desires, vocational calls may change through time and may override both intrinsic desires and extrinsic rewards. Thus, uncertainty exists as to whether the employee will *always and forever* support or be suitable for a specified position and a periodic post-tenure review and probationary period appears to be desirable institutional tool.

Summary and Conclusions

The above analysis has examined the nature of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives. Based on this analysis, it appears that, although much of the literature addresses extrinsic incentive methods and programs in higher education, intrinsic incentives may effectively cause some employees to ignore extrinsic rewards. Furthermore, based on this analysis, a vocational call, most commonly acknowledged in religious institutions, may cause some employees to ignore both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives.

Because intrinsic incentives always and vocational calls often (though not always) reflect personally held values, the above analysis suggests the validity of the earlier stated thesis: that to achieve sustained excellence institutions should assure that potential employees hold values that are compatible with institutional goals, objectives, policies, and procedures. The initial steps in the value alignment clearly should involve pre-employment recruiting, screening, and hiring processes. Because each employee may experience needs, values, and vocational calls that may change through time, value alignment needs to be continuously monitored after hiring and even after the employee attains a level of employment security.

This analysis suggests a need for additional research, especially with respect to the role that vocational call plays in religious colleges. Research questions may include, but not be limited to, institutional surveys regarding the role that institutional call plays in religious colleges, how such calls are handled, whether such calls have created management problems and, if so, describing the nature and solutions of those problems. Furthermore, one might more closely examine the role that personal values play in the hiring processes at religious colleges: Is the pre-employment examination of values limited to an examination of religious beliefs and lifestyles or does it also regularly include desires and vocational calls that potentially impact function (e.g., teaching, administration, and research)?

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